Wikileaks magyar vonatkozású dokumentumok (frissítve jan. 9-én)

cablesearch.org – Távirat keresés a Wikileaks adatbázisában

10BUDAPEST34 – OPPOSITION LEADER VIKTOR ORBAN CONFIDENT OF UPCOMING ELECTORAL VICTORY IN INTRODUCING MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

Az egész site egy file-ban (torrent) 2010 12. 10.

(index.hu)
Megvannak az első magyar Wikileaks-dokumentumok
(rusrep.run-n) *
Magyar bürokratikus túlélőről írnak a Wikileaks-iratokban
(guardian.co.uk-n) *
Afganisztáni szerepvállalásról…
09KABUL1239
Adatgyűjtésre kérték a Magyarországon dolgozó diplomatákat
09STATE62393

(wikileaks)
A Hungary illetve Budapest kifejezésekre keresve a következőket kaptam:
(ez nem jelenti, hogy feltétlenül Magyarországról szólnak)
06LAPAZ3449

08BERLIN1387
08MOSCOW3380
09KABUL1239
09MOSCOW2529
09STATE62393
10STATE17263

(frissítve dec. 9.)
09KYIV1942
07PARIS3919

(frissítve dec. 10.)
10ZAGREB53

(frissítve dec. 12.)
09USUNNEWYORK



Régebbi post ugyanebben a témában…

*a wikileaks-en nem találom o.O

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9 comments
  1. VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBUL #1239/01 1370551
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH (TAO)
    O 170551Z MAY 09
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8907
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 001239
    CORRECTED COPY -TEXT
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
    STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
    SUBJECT: SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: A SNAPSHOT OF THE NORTHEAST

    KABUL 00001239 001.6 of 005

    Classified By: PRT and Sub-National Governance Director
    Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (U) Summary: A recent trip to the northeast by a
    representative of the Embassy’s Provincial Reconstruction
    Team-Sub-National Governance team confirmed the presence
    there of a number of the same challenges thwarting progress
    elsewhere in Afghanistan. It also served to dispel a few
    misconceptions about the region. Among the challenges are
    poor governance and corruption. Among the misconceptions
    dispelled are the notions that there are only negligible
    security issues in the northeast and that development
    assistance, particularly from the Germans, is readily
    available to address the most pressing needs. In fact, there
    appears to be a genuine threat to future ISAF resupply
    convoys through Kunduz. As far as development aid is
    concerned, Germans on the ground are frustrated by the limits
    and constraints under which they have to operate; and funds
    available from the Hungarians in Baghlan province provide
    only a drop of help in a desert of need. End Summary.

    Security: More Dangers than Sometimes Assumed
    ——————————————— –

    ¶2. (SBU) The fact that the PRT came under RPG attack
    during Emboff’s visit risked coloring his impressions
    regarding security in the northeast; but in fact, there do
    appear to be some serious security issues needing to be
    addressed. Clearly the most compelling is the festering
    situation in Chahar Darrah district in Kunduz. It is a bit
    unnerving to realize that villages literally a stone’s throw
    from the main north-south road linking Kabul to the border
    crossing with Tajikistan at Sherkan-Bandar are in a security
    no-go area owing to the presence there of insurgent elements.
    This is hardly an abstract concern, given increased
    prospects of ISAF using the road as an important resupply
    route. A joint ANSF/German operation in the district from
    late December to mid-January managed to expel mid-level
    insurgent commanders and suppress low-level fighters. Key
    leaders, however, have been moving back into the district and
    the PRT in Kunduz is expecting the worst this summer. As the
    then-PRT commander reasoned in late March, the Taliban feel a
    need to surge in order to demonstrate their reach, especially
    in light of the influx of additional U.S. troops to
    Afghanistan.

    ¶3. (C) Rocket attacks on the PRT and a rise in IED
    incidents in the area are seen as a harbinger of things to
    come. The same German commander (the position shifts every
    six months) was more rigorous than some of his predecessors
    in addressing the insurgent threat, sending his soldiers to
    patrol in Chahar Darrah even at night. But he expressed
    frustration at the unwieldiness of the German interagency
    bureaucracy in Berlin that left the PRT unable to move
    forward quickly with job- and income-generating projects in
    Chahar Darrah at a time when, he felt, such activities could
    have helped cement gains made in the December-January
    operation. The increased pace of insurgent attacks in and
    around Kunduz since that commander’s departure have confirmed
    his worrying predictions. Whether more PRT projects could
    have prevented the ongoing security downturn in Chahar Darrah
    is hard to say. The commander himself noted the embarrassed
    reaction of local residents there at the time of the earlier
    operation over the New Year period. People told the Germans
    they were ashamed that international forces had had to come
    to help — that Afghan authorities were not paying heed to
    their calls for help and that Afghans themselves should have
    been able to address the situation.

    ¶4. (SBU) Kunduz Governor Omar shares the former PRT
    commander’s view on the fundamental source of the security
    problem, namely the lack of jobs. Equally important in his
    view, however, is the absence of a functioning legal system
    capable of dispensing real punishment to malefactors. He
    estimates the number of active insurgents in the province as
    between 150-200 and also anticipates an upsurge in attacks
    this year, as both Taliban and Hizb-e Islami seek to increase
    instability for the elections and demonstrate they can and do
    remain an active threat in the North. The governor further
    shares the assessment that insurgents are likely to target
    the expected increase in ISAF resupply convoys transiting the
    province. He bemoans what he sees as the squandering of
    earlier popular support for the government as a result of the
    government’s own inability/failure to act decisively in the
    area. He suggests poppy cultivation was left unchallenged
    for too long, the disbandment of illegal armed groups was not
    pursued with enough vigor and ministries have failed to
    coordinate among themselves or mount effective programs.

    ¶5. (C) Further to the south, ostensibly peaceful Baghlan

    Kabul 00001239 002.5 of 005

    Province faces a different set of security challenges. As
    the head of the UNAMA office for the region tells it, even
    though Baghlan generally flies under the national radar, it
    actually deserves to be labeled “the wild, wild west.”
    xxxxxxxxxxxx, behind-the-scenes
    contests for power (including on the part of the provincial
    chief of police); the influence of local strongmen and former
    mujahedeen (particularly in northern Baghlan); unchecked
    poppy cultivation in Andarab district; underlying
    Tajik-Pashtun tensions; and criminality all combine to
    undermine stability. Direct insurgent activity appears
    limited, but criminal elements have fashioned links to the
    Taliban. Locals have also made themselves available to
    execute for-hire insurgent missions. The Hungarian PRT does
    little to address any of these problems. They are not
    permitted to fire their weapons except in self-defense, do
    little more than patrol the main roads and undertake no
    counter-narcotics activities. When two Hungarian de-miners
    were killed doing their work, Budapest stopped sending mine
    clearers to the PRT. When the security situation in
    northeastern Bamyan Province was threatened by Baghlan-based
    malefactors, it was the New Zealanders who had to cross into
    Baghlan to address the problem. The PRT sees itself as
    focused on humanitarian assistance and small-scale
    development work. Again xxxxxxxxxxxx,
    his nation’s troops are looking to do their short stints in
    Afghanistan and get back home unscathed.

    ¶6. (SBU) The head of the Provincial Council (PC) in
    Baghlan sees one of the same factors cited by Governor Omar
    in Kunduz as undermining stability in his province too )
    namely the inability of the nascent formal legal system to
    address people,s need for justice. In fact, he claims as
    one of his PC’s singular achievements its intervention to
    settle legal disputes that the formal legal system failed to
    resolve in a timely manner. According to the PC chairman,
    one dispute over a murder had languished for 10 years but was
    settled in two days once a Council member from the affected
    district mediated. Another case involving a tribal killing
    had been with prosecutors and the court for 18 months but was
    settled in two hours with the Provincial Council’s help. It
    is questionable whether these cases were in fact “resolved”
    in a way that met formal justice standards, but it is
    noteworthy that these elected sub-national governance
    officials clearly believe they have done a service to their
    constituents and thereby brought the government and people
    closer by their actions.

    Governance ) A Weak Reed
    ————————-

    ¶7. (C) The governors in Kunduz and Takhar provinces are
    hardly among the country’s strongest. While Kunduz Governor
    Omar certainly talks a good game, the Germans see him as so
    thoroughly corrupt that they avoid all contact with him to
    the furthest extent possible. This can hardly make for
    optimal synchronization of security, governance and
    development efforts. The PRT insists, however, that to be
    seen working with the governor would seriously taint them in
    the eyes of local residents. As a case in point, they
    suggest their efforts to construct a bridge across the Kunduz
    River into Chahar Darrah district (an obvious security
    priority) have been stalled not least because of the
    governor’s shady dealings with the government land needed for
    access to the site of the bridge crossing (the Germans also
    say they had to re-bid the construction contract for the
    bridge to enable a firm favored by a deputy minister at the
    Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) to come out
    the winner). Governor Omar himself places a finger of blame
    on the poor quality of some of his district administrators.
    In other instance, however, he suggests the Independent
    Director of Local Governance,s (IDLG) emphasis on education
    qualifications has saddled districts with officials ignorant
    of the important local social networks and power
    relationships. He complains as well about his lack of funds
    and argues that the inability of some line ministries in
    Kunduz to spend their full allocations from Kabul exacerbates
    the problem. The Kunduz PRT’s German development advisor had
    high praise for the activities of USAID’s Local Governance
    and Community Development (LGCD) program in the province but
    noted the lack of a civil service training institute in
    Kunduz, the most important city in the northeast.

    ¶8. (C) While Takhar Governor Ibrahimi may check the Uzbek
    ethnic box, he appears to have little else going for him, at
    least judging by a desultory 90-minute meeting he gave to
    Emboff. Despite evidence to the contrary, according to the
    governor his province has virtually no major challenges,
    aside from the inadequacy of international development

    Kabul 00001239 003.2 of 005

    assistance. He suggested that, thanks to his own efforts as
    well as those of NDS and ANP and the cooperation of local
    elders and religious leaders, security in the province is
    good and insurgents are “under control;” weapons have been
    surrendered in fully half of the province’s districts; women
    play an active role, including in government service; the
    Governor makes special efforts to press district
    administrators working under him to respect human rights; and
    anti-corruption efforts are underway. He dismissed reports
    of weapons smuggling through the province as inaccurate and
    blamed what he admitted is some heroin and opium smuggling on
    the existence of an active drug market across Takhar’s border
    in Tajikistan. According to the German PRT in Kunduz,
    Ibrahimi’s extortion schemes are netting him $40,000 a month
    from Takhar residents.

    ¶9. (C) If there is a bright spot in governance in the
    northeast, it may be Governor Barakzai in Baghlan. While it
    is still early days, xxxxxxxxxxxx sees Barakzai as a breath of fresh air. While the
    provincial chief of police reportedly ran roughshod over
    Barakzai’s predecessor, the new governor has put the ANP
    chief off balance (it may help that Barakzai brought with him
    to Baglan his own bodyguard force). For the moment, the
    governor appears to have co-opted the police chief as well as
    the local NDS head, is gaining in prestige among the local
    movers and shakers and has even gone some distance in
    quieting unease among the province’s large Tajik population
    over his appointment (he is a Pashtun).

    ¶10. (C) Comments by some key international stakeholders
    raise doubts that UNAMA’s local operations are likely to
    contribute much to turning around the situation on governance
    in the region. The German PRT in Kunduz reports that the
    local UNAMA office has little to offer, in contrast to
    UNAMA’s facility in Maza-I Sharif. As the PRT sees it,
    UNAMA’s Kunduz office does not coordinate or align donors,
    has no humanitarian assistance officer and has failed so far
    to provide much needed district mapping for Chahar Darrah
    district. In Baghlan, where UNAMA placed three people late
    last year, xxxxxxxxxxxx goes so far as to label
    UNAMA’s role in the province “just a joke.” He takes aim
    particularly at what he suggests is a failure by local UNAMA
    staff to exercise a coordinating role. In UNAMA’s defense,
    the head of UNAMA’s regional office in Kunduz notes that
    personnel reinforcements are in the pipeline. She points in
    particular to the upcoming addition of a governance unit,
    with two additional international staffers.

    Development: No Pockets are Deep Enough
    —————————————–

    ¶11. (U) Three of the four provinces of the northeast enjoy
    something of an advantage in having as their “patron” the
    Germans, who see their mission as development-focused.
    Germany currently channels 130 million euros a year in
    assistance to Afghanistan, with 60 percent of this going to
    the three provinces of Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan, as well
    as to Balkh (home of the German-led Regional Command North).
    Of those three northeastern provinces, Badakhshan receives
    the largest share because of its greater needs. The Kunduz
    corridor also comes in for a fair share of the funding, with
    Takhar receiving the least. The German Development Agency
    (GTZ) does, however, maintain an office in Taloqan, Takhar’s
    capital. The Germans are seriously considering
    rehabilitating and paving the direct road link between Kunduz
    and Mazar-e Sharif over the next few years, at an estimated
    cost of 54 million euros for the 60-mile stretch. They were
    instrumental in getting EC funding for the rehabilitation of
    the major irrigation system along the Taloqan River in Takhar
    and are putting 1.6 million euros into repairing the adjacent
    Khanabad I power station (damaged in the war).

    ¶12. (U) Such large-scale projects, rather than the quick
    impact projects that were once a staple of the German PRT in
    Kunduz, are sought increasingly by the local population. But
    even for smaller projects, the PRT has tried to better target
    local desires and needs by establishing a special Provincial
    Development Fund (PDF). Each of the three provinces in the
    PRT’s area of responsibility is awarded 800,000 euros a year
    in projects approved by an eight-member panel composed of
    four Germans and four Afghans, including representative from
    the respective Provincial Councils and governors’ offices.

    ¶13. (SBU) Despite their best efforts, the Germans in the
    field in the northeast are frustrated by the cumbersomeness
    of their own government bureaucracy. As the Kunduz DEVAD
    explains it, back in 2003 the Berlin ministries with a stake
    in development assistance worked out an agreement defining
    the specific sectors to which assistance would be directed.

    Kabul 00001239 004.4 of 005

    These include such areas as drinking water supply, basic
    education, gender, renewable energy and provision of
    technical cooperation and advice. The list did not include a
    sector that is key in this relatively well-watered region,
    namely agriculture; and this has come to hamper the
    effectiveness of the overall effort of the PRT. It appears
    all but impossible to have the basic list of priority sectors
    reexamined, given the existing balance of interests between
    the various German ministries. This makes it extremely
    difficult for the PRT to respond to evolving, sometimes
    pressing needs. This year, in what they consider a major
    victory, the PRT managed to extract 500,000 euros in extra
    funding from the German Foreign Ministry and the German Bank
    for Reconstruction and Development (KFW) for urgently needed
    projects in Chahar Darrah. None of this assistance, however,
    keeps local authorities from complaining, sometimes bitterly,
    about their neglect ) particularly relative to what they see
    as truly massive aid being channeled to the country,s east
    and south.

    ¶14. (U) Baghlan falls into that unfortunate category of
    provinces stuck with the fatal combination of a fairly benign
    environment and a fairly indigent PRT. The result is minimal
    international development assistance. The Hungarians spend
    about $30 million a year to maintain their PRT outpost. They
    invest another $3 million a year in development assistance,
    with $300,000 directed at infrastructure improvements (the
    section of the Ring Road in the province south of Pol-i
    Khumri is still unpaved). The PRT has a budget of $500,000
    for civ-mil quick impact projects. The NGO Hungarian
    Interchurch Aid (HIA) serves as implementer for much of
    Hungary’s aid.

    Self-Sacrifice a Lost Virtue? Yes and No
    ——————————————-

    ¶15. (U) A visit to the Baghlan sugar refinery just north
    of the provincial capital provided a window on the challenges
    of reviving what little industry or processing capabilities
    the country still possesses. The mill, which ran from 1929
    until 1976 as a private concern, suffered like the rest of
    the country from decades of war but was reopened in 2005
    after being reborn as a private-public partnership. The
    enterprise was capitalized at 15.6 million euros, with the
    Afghan government holding a 30 percent stake and the
    remainder in the hands of two German companies and four local
    Afghans. The refinery first produced sugar again in 2006,
    but its potential has been difficult to realize because of a
    local roundworm infestation that originated in the former
    Soviet Union and now covers all of Baghlan. In that year
    fully 70 percent of the harvest was lost to the infestation.
    The following year no beets were grown, and in 2008 only 40
    hectares of the 260 hectares planted survived. And this was
    only due to some farmers having planted beets as their second
    crop ) the worms did not have the entire season to do their
    damage. xxxxxxxxxxxx this is a tragedy for the country since it is
    currently importing sugar at a cost of $450 million a year.
    A possible solution would be to allow fields to lie fallow
    for a time, but xxxxxxxxxxxx has been unable to convince farmers to
    follow his advice.

    ¶16. (SBU) Roundworm is not the only challenge facing he
    refinery. It was, notoriously, the site of an explosive
    attack in November 2007 that resulted in death and injury to
    as many as 75 people, including women and children. A
    six-member delegation from the Wolesi Jirga’s economics
    committee died in the incident. Although the German
    development agency (GTZ) does not generally support
    agricultural projects in Afghanistan, it did come up with the
    funds to make extensive security improvements to the
    office/residence complex at the mill. xxxxxxxxxxxx a
    continuing threat of kidnapping. xxxxxxxxxxxx has also had to hire
    a local strongman as his assistant to run interference for
    him with locals seeking to extort this or that advantage for
    themselves from the plant.

    ¶17. (U) The problem of locals seeking immediate, personal
    gain is not confined to the mill. xxxxxxxxxxxx recounts it, the
    well-known cheese factory across the street from his mill
    gave local farmers dairy cows to help ensure the factory
    would have a steady supply of milk. Much to the annoyance of
    the managers of that plant, many of the farmers instead sold
    the animals. xxxxxxxxxxxx complains further that farmers have
    demanded $4000 from the mill to clear their own irrigation
    canals, something they traditionally have done for
    themselves. xxxxxxxxxxxx suggests a simple assessment of $2 per
    head among the farmers would get the job done.

    ¶18. (U) Elsewhere enlightened self-interest still has a

    Kabul 00001239 005.2 of 005

    place. At least this is what is reported by the Louis Berger
    Group (LBG) project managers guiding the USAID-funded
    construction of the 60-mile engineering marvel that is the
    Feyzabad-to-Kishim highway through the Hindu Kush in
    Badakhshan Province. This massive $120-130 million
    undertaking is forcing a 30-meter wide highway alongside the
    Mashhad River by means of major hill-leveling and blasting
    works. If the Germans ultimately do decide to rebuild the
    direct road between Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif, then an
    improved asphalt band will link people and commerce across
    the entire north of Afghanistan, from Feyzabad in the east to
    Sherberghan and Meymaneh in the west. While government and
    security officials at all levels in Badakhshan have been
    quite supportive of USAID,s project, the LBG engineers are
    especially impressed by the readiness of farmers along the
    route to give up a significant part of their extremely
    limited mountainside acreage for the sake of the road.
    Although GIRoA is supposed to pay compensation, project
    managers doubt this is actually happening. The company
    maintains two community development offices to work as
    liaisons with local residents and has tried to be
    accommodating, for example by allowing time for harvesting of
    targeted fields and by rerouting of affected irrigation
    channels. They marvel nonetheless at the goodwill they have
    encountered despite the destruction of 400-500 houses, many
    of which have been dismantled by the residents themselves.

    ¶19. (U) The on-site project managers point to one other
    important advantage they enjoy ) good security. They had
    some IEDs and rockets to deal with last year, but things are
    going well now. Without good security, they say, it would be
    impossible to build the road through the area’s mountainous
    terrain where they and their crews are often dwarfed by still
    higher ground above them. The NDS licenses their protection
    teams, who are made up basically of the troops of local
    commanders. Another advantage of good security is their
    ability to find willing Afghan subcontractors. Some of these
    firms once worked in the southeast and reinvested their
    earnings in the purchase of expensive road construction
    equipment. Those Afghan businessmen are reluctant to work
    again in those now more insecure areas for fear of losing
    their equipment to insurgent attack.
    Eikenberry

  2. Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
    09STATE62393 2009-06-16 21:09 2010-12-02 20:08 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State

    INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 VIN-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 COME-00 CTME-00
    INL-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 DS-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00 OIGO-00
    FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 FRB-00 H-00 TEDE-00 IO-00
    JUSE-00 LAB-01 L-00 CAC-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 CDC-00
    VCIE-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OIC-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00
    GIWI-00 PPT-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 IRM-00
    DPM-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 BBG-00 R-00 EPAE-00 DSCC-00
    DRL-00 G-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SRAP-00 /001R

    R 162142Z JUN 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
    INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
    CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

    S E C R E T STATE 062393

    NOFORN

    EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2034
    TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, HU
    SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: HUNGARY
    REF: STATE 18763

    Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

    ¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Hungary (paragraph 3-end and encourages Department personnel at post to assist in compiling Hungarian biographic information (paragraph 2).
    ¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Hungary and sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Hungary. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
    ¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
    ¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

    ¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Hungary:
    ¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community’s collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Hungarians as information becomes available.
    ¶B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Hungary: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles”, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Hungarian NHCD: priority issues:
    ¶A. Governance and Internal Development 1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H) 2) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4) 3) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4) 4) Political Evolution, Extremism, and Human Rights (DEPS-4H) 5) National Leadership (LEAD-4H) B. Foreign Relations 1) Russia (FPOL-4H) 2) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 3) European Union (FPOL-4H) 4) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) 5) The United States (FPOL-4H) C. National Security 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 4) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 5) Money Laundering (MONY-5) 6) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-5) 7) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) D. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)

    ¶4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
    ¶A. Governance and Internal Development
    1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Hungarian dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
    2) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Plans and efforts to finance debt. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, unemployment, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.
    3) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4). Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government, non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, financial stability, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Corruption within political parties, especially the ruling party. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about cyber crime. Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems. Plans and efforts to combat intellectual property rights crime.
    4) Political Evolution, Extremism, and Human Rights (DEPS-4H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within and between political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support. Information about the Hungarian Guard. Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of minority issues influencing political developments or internal stability. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.
    5) National Leadership (LEAD-4H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents, especially regarding the premier,s inner circle. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability, personality, financial, health, and biometric information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
    ¶B. Foreign Relations
    1) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade. Details about personal relations between Hungarian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership, intelligence officials, opposition, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies. Leadership and public views about relations with Russia. Hungarian perceptions about, and response to, Russian efforts to influence, including through financial assistance, Hungarian political parties. Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic objectives in the region, and Hungary,s vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence.
    2) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with regional neighbors, including Germany. Hungarian participation in US-sponsored programs designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy civil-military relations, and effective management of military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense. Plans and efforts regarding Visegrad Group.
    3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Priorities, plans, and efforts regarding 2011 EU presidency. Evidence of, and thoughts about, increasing reliance upon EU, and diminishing reliance upon US, regional leadership. Plans and efforts regarding EuroZone. Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Details about formal and informal alliances between Hungary and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
    4) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China and nations that are hostile to US interests.
    5) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora. Plans and efforts regarding bilateral agreements, such as nuclear non-proliferation agreements, with the US.
    ¶C. National Security
    1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
    2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Hungarian soil, NATO commands in Hungary, and out-of-country deployments of Hungarian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
    3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations and actors. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
    4) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.

    5) Money Laundering (MONY-5). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.

    6) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-5). Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Organizational readiness and capability of border police and customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts to implement legislation and enforce effective export licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Hungary as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engaged in sales of weapons or technologies to states that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities. Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties and arrangements.

    7) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
    ¶D. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Details about command and control systems and facilities. National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and training. Information about current, and planned upgrades to, public sector communications systems and technologies, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals, trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, and cable and fiber networks. Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating systems, to include second generation and third generation systems. Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication purposes, including planned system upgrades. Details about Internet and Intranet use and infrastructure, including government oversight. Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications service providers and vendors. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology. Details about information repositories associated with radio frequency identification enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
    CLINTON

  3. VZCZCXRO8278
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHVB #0053/01 0261340
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 261340Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9847
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

    Tuesday, 26 January 2010, 13:40
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000053
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, AND INL/AAE
    EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020
    TAGS PGOV, PREL, KCOR, HR
    SUBJECT: CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND
    OTHER “UNTOUCHABLES” FOR CORRUPTION
    REF: 09 ZAGREB 644
    Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic has outlined to us several ongoing corruption cases targeting former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and other top government officials. Prosecutors are developing at least one case against the former PM which could result in his indictment, and they are continuing to uncover evidence in several other cases which could also implicate Sanader. PM Kosor has strengthened anti-corruption efforts by creating interagency teams to investigate the most serious cases of corruption in state-owned enterprises, while the Ministers of Interior and Justice have warned that there are no “untouchables” in the corruption clampdown. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) In a series of meetings in early to mid-January, Croatian Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic described several ongoing corruption probes to Poloff which target former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, current and former ministers, and nearly all major state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bajic said that Sanader has possible involvement in several cases, but the one in which prosecutors have gathered the most evidence involves illegal mediation between his friends and Hypo Alpe Adria Bank Group of Austria. The Hypo Bank case indicates that Sanader allegedly arranged a DM 4 million loan for his neighbor, Miroslav Kutle, in the 1990’s and received a DM 800,000 kickback from Kutle in return. XXXXXXXXXXXX is cooperating with the anti-corruption prosecutors (USKOK), and XXXXXXXXXXXX story has been corroborated by XXXXXXXXXXXX with knowledge of the transactions. The illegal mediation charge for receiving gifts and benefits while abusing an official position to secure business transactions carries a prison term of one to five years. Bajic said that Hypo Bank is cooperating with the investigation.

    ¶3. (C) Sanader is also implicated in several corruption cases involving the Transportation Ministry. Transport Minister Bozidar Kalmeta has been under fire for several months due to corruption cases XXXXXXXXXXXX Bajic said that Sanader often bypassed Kalmeta and gave instructions about how to handle certain cases directly to . Bajic did note, however, that XXXXXXXXXXXX should have at least been aware of what was happening within XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    ¶4. (C) Bajic said his office is leading interagency teams established under orders from PM Kosor to deal with five priority cases involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs): XXXXXXXXXXXX. The teams, led by the prosecutor’s Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), meet daily and include the Police, Tax Administration, Finance Police, and other experts. Bajic said he believes that all major Croatian SOEs are now under investigation. Chief of Police Oliver Grbic told reporters in mid-January that police were running twelve investigations during the past six months intoXXXXXXXXXXXX management officials of public companies.

    ¶5. (C) A sixth company under investigation, Podravka, has 26 percent government ownership, and parliament approves the supervisory board. At least seven members of the board, all affiliated with the ruling coalition, were arrested, and Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister of Economy and former Podravka executive) Damir Polancec resigned in October 2009. Dinko Cvitan, head of USKOK, confirmed to poloff on January 21 that USKOK has now opened a formal investigation of Polancec for illegal mediation. The scandal involves embezzlement and fraudulent loans by several Podravka-linked firms in an attempt by managers to buy controlling interest in the company. Bajic said he needed several documents from XXXXXXXXXXXX in Hungary to move forward with charges in the case, and initially described efforts to secure them from Hungary as “catastrophic.” XXXXXXXXXXXX and several Hungarian officials were uncooperative, he said, XXXXXXXXXXXX. During a January 18 meeting between PM Kosor and Hungarian PM Bajnai, PM Bajnai told press that documents relating to Podravka’s XXXXXXXXXXXX were sent on to Croatia on January 15; Bajic said he received a Hungarian prosecutor’s
    ZAGREB 00000053 002 OF 002
    report on XXXXXXXXXXXX’s dealings with Podravka on January 22.

    ¶6. (U) Minister of Interior Tomislav Karamarko and Minister of Justice Ivan Simonovic have also been spearheading a public relations campaign to publicize the “war on corruption” in Croatia. Simonovic said on Croatian Radio that “no one can be above the law — either former or present or future presidents or prime ministers.” He went on to add that “there have always been untouchables, but this is the first time in the history of Croatia that there won’t be untouchables anymore.”

    ¶7. (C) COMMENT: An important test of Croatia’s anti-corruption efforts will be the ability to go after the biggest fish. For several years, Bajic has been extremely hesitant to open even a formal investigation, let alone seek an indictment against high-ranking officials, unless he felt he had a watertight case. The opening of the formal investigation against Polancec, and Bajic’s assessment that the Hypo Bank case currently has solid evidence against Sanader, are strong signs that some “big fish” may soon face formal charges, joining former Defense and Interior Minister Berislav Roncevic, who is currently under indictment for a truck procurement scandal during his time at the MoD (reftel). While the illegal mediation charges being considered against Sanader and Polancec may seem rather minor, Bajic suggests that there is likely much more to be uncovered involving the former PM. In any case, as Bajic likes to point out, Al Capone was brought down for tax evasion rather than for his more notorious activities. FOLEY

  4. from rusrep.ru

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000807 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR GEORGIA TASK FORCE AND EUR/CE-JAMIE LAMORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM, RU, GG, HU SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: U.S. PROPOSAL FOR STRONG NAC STATEMENT CONDEMNING RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN GEORGIA REF: SECSTATE 85678 Classified By: PolOff Ryan C. Leong, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C) Ref talking points were delivered on August 11 to Vilmos Hamikus, Acting State Secretary for Political Affairs at the GoH Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hamikus agreed with the main principals of the talking points, namely the need for a cease fire and cessation of hostilities, however he also noted to Charge and PolOff that a strongly worded response from the EU was unlikely. Hamikus said it was important that any NATO and EU statements be as similar as possible, since Russia would be watching very carefully for gaps between the two for future exploitation. Hungary is in the process of formulating its position for the NAC meeting on August 12 and the EU GAERC meeting on August 13. The GAERC may be attended by GoH Foreign Minister Kinga Goncz. 2. (C) Hamikus said that Russia was “smart enough to go far enough,” implying that Russia was in the process of creating enough diplomatic and geographic maneuvering space to negotiate an advantageous position in Georgia. He stated that the Russians likely had an easy negotiating path ahead given the military gains made; the Georgians would unfortunately be in a weaker position and probably be forced to make concessions. Hamikus added that it could only boost Russia’s overall foreign and security policy that two potential NATO members (Georgia and Ukraine) could end up in this imbroglio, sidetracking their accession aspirations. 3. (C) Hamikus agreed that the Russian response is entirely out of proportion. Hungary would not object to tough language in either a NAC or GAERC statement. However, Hamikus expected objections to aggressive language against Russia would come from the typical quarters, namely Italy and Germany. He was thankful that the French are currently holding the reins of the EU Presidency as they are “braver” than other EU members. 4. (C) The GoH has not been contacted by diplomatic missions from Russia or Georgia thus far. Hungary has no official diplomatic representation in Georgia at present, as it was in the process of establishing a mission. Levine

  5. rusrep.ru>>

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000821 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR GEORGIA TASK FORCE AND EUR/CE-JAMIE LAMORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PHUM, OSCE, UN, GG, RS, HU SUBJECT: TFGG01: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RUSSIA RESPONSIBILITIES REF: SECSTATE 87254 Classified By: Charge Jeff Levine, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (U) This is an action request. See Paragraph 6. 2. (C) SUMMARY: Ref points were delivered on 14 August to GoH Ministry of Foreign Affairs State Secretaries Dr. Jeno Faller and Vilmos Hamikus. Charge also delivered ref points to Ambassador Karoly Banai, Chief Foreign and Security Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister. Interlocutors in both meetings felt Hungary had been quite forward leaning at the recent NAC and GAERC meetings (contrary to U.S. perception). Russian Ambassador Igor Savolskiy visited the MFA earlier in the day to state that Russia was “not happy with facts or timing” of the recent GoH statement but, overall, considered it “moderate” (para 7). Hungary collected 800 kilograms of emergency medical aid equipment for Georgia and requests U.S. assistance in transporting the shipment to needed areas. End summary. “This was typical Soviet behavior” ———————————- 3. (C) Speaking for the GoH Prime Minister’s office, Banai said the Hungarian position had been “very firm” at both the NAC and GAERC meetings. Hungary’s position is very clear. Banai said, “Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be questioned,” adding that the, “Russian response was entirely disproportionate to the situation.” Banai noted that Georgia clearly miscalculated but Russia’s response was worse. Of paramount importance was that NATO and the EU react unanimously in facing down the threat to democracy in Georgia, according to Banai. With that said, however, Banai argued that communication “must be maintained with the Russians.” Kremlin Calling ————— 4. (C) Faller and Hamikus also felt Hungary had shown resolve in the GAERC meeting by supporting a statement that condemned the “disproportionate Russian military response” and the message that “this conflict has an impact on EU-Russia relations.” Charge and PolOff noted that ref demarche was a request to approach the Russian Government directly, which Faller said Hungary was unlikely to do given that Russian Ambassador Savolskiy had just been in. Savolskiy raised humanitarian aid for Georgians before expressing Moscow’s displeasure with the facts and timing of the GoH statement. He was further incensed at the recent statement from opposition party FIDESZ, which Savolskiy labeled “immoral” (para 8). 5. (C) COMMENT: Hungary believes it is in the same camp as those taking a firm stance against Russia, however their desire for “balance” and “communication” sets them apart from more hard-line neighbors. End comment. 6. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests a response to Hungary’s request for transport of emergency humanitarian aid to Georgia. The MFA is aware of U.S. C-17s delivering supplies to Tbilisi and would like to somehow include the 800 kilogram, 10 cubic meter shipment collected by the Hungarian government. A complete manifest of the medical items can be faxed to the Department. 7. (U) Begin text of GoH statement: Hungarian Foreign Minister Kinga Goncz has initiated that the government should adopt a decision on granting immediate humanitarian aid to the victims of the Georgian-Russian conflict. At the EU foreign ministers meeting on Wednesday, Goncz is going to make a proposal for the reconstruction of Georgia’s war damage. The Hungarian government greets Georgia’s intention to make peace and sign the peace plan, and the Russian announcement on cessation of military operations. Hungary is concerned about the latest military actions in Georgia, which may affect security in the entire Caucasian region, and endanger peace and security. The Hungarian government is convinced that the conflict can only be resolve through negotiations, with the involvement of the international community. Hungary takes a stand for respecting Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, and qualifies the Russian armed action disproportionate in extent and territorial scope. Hungary supports the efforts of the sides concerned and the international organizations to settle the conflict peacefully as soon as possible. End text. 8. (U) Begin text of FIDESZ statement: What happened is BUDAPEST 00000821 002 OF 002 unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. In the situation that has evolved as a result of the Russian-Georgian conflict, the question is whether the international community will be strong, wise and considerate enough to make it clear that existing conflicts cannot be settled in ways that are unacceptable in the 21st century. What Russians are saying now is not at all different from what they said about Hungary in 1956. The simple fact is that foreign troops are deployed in the territory of another country, bombing cities and killing innocent civilians. Hungary must take a clear stance. It must be clearly and strongly stated that Europe, in cooperation with America, has a responsibility and also has the means that it can use in such historic moments. Hungary should not take the position of an external observer but that of a Central European country. End text. Levine

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